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Abstract
We examine the relationship between o⁄shoring and the labour market in an occupational
choice model of trade and endogenous growth where workers are employed on the basis of their
individual skill levels. Trade liberalization leads to o⁄shoring and reduces employment in the
manufacturing sector. Displaced workers move into the traditional and innovation sectors ac-
cording to their skill levels, shaping real wages and aggregate productivity in the manufacturing
sector. The paper aims to show how inter-sectoral labour market adjustments, highlighted by
skill heterogeneity, could be a possible explanation for the simultaneous rise in productivity and
reduction in real wages that have coincided with the sharp escalation of o⁄shoring activities in
the US manufacturing sector since 2004.
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11 Introduction
The theme of globalization has evolved with the changing emphasis of the debate about the costs and
bene￿ts of greater integration of the world economy. In the beginning, debate focused on free trade.
Then during the 1990￿ s signi￿cantly greater growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) over that in
trade in goods made FDI, and related issues such as labour and environmental standards, the main
theme of globalization. Over the last decade, the emergence of China and India has highlighted the
importance of intra-industry trade and the o⁄shoring of di⁄erent stages of production. The debate
on the consequences of globalization continues with o⁄shoring as the main focus now.
Sharply di⁄ering views on o⁄shoring have created confusion in major industrial nations about
its economic consequences. O⁄shoring is seen chie￿ y as a cost-saving strategy for ￿rms, who at
times see it as their only means of survival. It has also been associated with increased pro￿tability,
enhanced productivity, and stronger long-run economic growth. Shifting the spotlight from pro￿ts
to people, typically consumers should also bene￿t from the lower prices that follow such cost-saving
strategies. Yet these same consumers, relabeled as workers, tend to be at the center of widespread
public concerns associated with o⁄shoring: loss of jobs, lower wages, and in turn, lower standards of
living.
The impact of o⁄shoring is not the same for all industries and workers in society. In particular,
the skill levels of workers play a decisive role in determining who gains and who loses. O⁄shoring
activities are often thought to exploit lower labour costs in the South, making newly employed
Southern workers better o⁄ at the expense of displaced lower skilled workers in the North. This
is also sometimes associated with additional downward pressure on the wages of other workers still
employed in the home country. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) have gone one step beyond
traditional trade models to show how o⁄shoring particular tasks could have a positive impact on
the real wages of all workers. While they study the international trade in tasks, in a setting where
skills are homogeneous within each sector, we focus on the consequences of o⁄shoring caused by
the inter-sectoral mobility of workers with heterogeneous skill levels. Indeed, the impact of this
sectoral reallocation of labour and/or manufacturing activities on the fate of workers has recently
2been emphasized by several articles such as Olsen (2006) and Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2004):
some workers move to inferior jobs, while others are promoted to new jobs created by opportunities
opened up through trade. This double dimension could reveal a number of missing links between
o⁄shoring and the labour market that are not explained by traditional trade models.
[￿gure 1 about here]
We construct a simple theoretical model of o⁄shoring to explain a number of contradictory
stylized facts about o⁄shoring and the labour market in the US manufacturing sector over the last
decade. Figure 1 illustrates the recent o⁄shoring trend and, in particular, highlights the sharp
escalation in the o⁄shoring activities of US manufacturing ￿rms since 2004. While the ￿rst panel
shows total real imports of goods into the US, the second and third panels show a rise in US
direct investments abroad and an increase in imports from foreign a¢ liates to parent ￿rms in the
US. Our model o⁄ers a possible explanation of how these trends can be associated with a series
of stylized facts for the US labour market over the same period, namely a simultaneous (1) fall
in employment, (2) rise in productivity, and (3) reduction of wages in the manufacturing sector.1
Figure 2 summarizes these trends showing that the growth in o⁄shoring and the fall in employment
have been accompanied by an increase in productivity in this sector on the one hand and lower real
wages since 2004 on the other.2
[￿gure 2 about here]
To study the puzzling negative relationship between labour productivity and real wages, we view
this phenomenon from the occupational choice perspective pioneered by Roy (1951) and applied in
an international trade context by Yeaple (2005). In addition, we incorporate an innovation sector
into the model using an endogenous growth framework a l￿ Grossman and Helpman (1991). For
1Economists have to a large extent concentrated on the relative wages between skilled and unskilled workers in
industrialized countries. For instance, Ekholm and Ulltveit-Moe (2007) build a theoretical model to explain the
bell-shaped evolution of relative wages between di⁄erent skill segments in the US economy over the last three decades.
2Baily and Lawrence (2004) for instance argue that the basic reason for the decline in US manufacturing employment
is that although demand for the output of this sector has grown about as quickly as GDP, it has not grown fast
enough to o⁄set the productivity growth in this sector. They see the rise of trade and o⁄shoring and this increase in
productivity among the main factors explaining the loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector.
3the purposes of this paper we assume that product varieties are only developed in the North, and
we refer to o⁄shoring as a shift of production to an export platform, from which ￿nished goods are
exported back to the country of origin for consumption.3 The incentive for this production shift
is created by a decrease in trade costs which increases the accessibility of the Northern market for
manufacturing goods produced with lower labour costs in the South. Our model shows that labour
market adjustments between a traditional sector that does not require skills and a manufacturing
sector that employs workers with intermediate skill levels determine the real wages of workers in
each sector. The shift of the lowest skilled workers to this residual sector results in lower real wages
in the manufacturing sector. We also show how the impact of o⁄shoring on productivity depends on
the degrees to which the traditional and innovation sectors respectively absorb low and high skilled
workers released from the manufacturing sector.
The model also provides several secondary results in accordance with the existing literature on
policy issues and the future of o⁄shoring. These are (1) stimulated innovation and enhanced growth
in the North, (2) increased wage inequality in the South, and (3) increased wage inequality in the
North between the skilled and the unskilled. Economists who see o⁄shoring as an opportunity to
increase productivity and growth often dismiss competition concerns that arise from free access to a
large low-wage global labour pool. As put forward by Mankiw and Swagel (2006) o⁄shoring appears
to increase US employment and investment due to new jobs created both in the US and abroad.
In an estimate for the year 2015, Baily and Lawrence (2004) predict that o⁄shoring will enhance
economic growth in the US.4 In one of the few other empirical studies on o⁄shoring and growth,
Mann (2003, 2006) explores the e⁄ects of information hardware technology o⁄shoring on the US
economy. She ￿nds that o⁄shoring is linked to dynamic gains, i.e. increased real GDP. On increased
wage inequality in the North, empirical ￿ndings such as Hijzen (2007) ￿nd evidence of rising wage
inequality between low and high skilled workers as a result of technological change and o⁄shoring.5
Finally, our results on increased wage inequality in the South complement those of Antras, Garciano
3Bond (2001) uses a similar concept to discuss fragmented production.
4They perform simulations using a large-scale-macro-econometric model to ￿nd that US GDP, real compensation
of employees, and real pro￿ts will be higher in 2015 as a result of the lower prices of imports associated with o⁄shoring.
5See also Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 2003).
4and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), where globalization always leads to better employment matches for
Southern workers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and derives
the conditions for the steady-state. Section 3 examines the results of a comparative static analysis.
Concluding remarks are given in section 4. All proofs and derivations are provided in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a simple model of trade and endogenous growth with two countries, North and South,
and two factors, labour and land. Labour and land are both used in the production of traditional
goods (Y ), but the manufacturing (X) and innovation (I) sectors only employ labour. Asymmetries
exist between the production structures of the North and South. While both countries produce
traditional goods, only the North is capable of developing new product designs through investment
in the sole innovation sector. Product designs are used to produce varieties in the manufacturing
sector, but the location of this production depends on whether ￿rms decide to produce domestically
or o⁄shore production to the South. The share of the manufacturing industry located in each country
depends on this o⁄shoring decision.
2.1 Preferences
The preferences of households in the North and South di⁄er with respect to the expenditure-savings








where CX(t) and CY (t) are the respective consumptions of a manufacturing composite and the
traditional good at time t, ￿ is the discount rate, and 0 < ￿ < 1 is a parameter that determines the
expenditure shares for each good. The manufacturing composite takes the form of a CES quantity
















5where x(i;t) and x(j;t)￿ are the consumptions of varieties i and j, n(t) and n(t)￿ are the numbers
of varieties supplied by the North and South, and ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties. Intertemporal utility maximization requires that households choose an optimal
expenditure path that satis￿es a standard transversality condition and follows the basic Ramsey
saving rule as described by the following Euler equation:
_ E(t)
E(t)
= R(t) ￿ ￿; (2)
where E(t) is expenditure, R(t) is the nominal rate of return on a risk-free asset, and a dot over a
variable denotes di⁄erentiation with respect to time.
In contrast, households in the South consume only the traditional good. Furthermore, Southern
households have no access to the investment market and in each period use all income for consump-
tion. Hence, the utility function for Southern households is U(t)￿ = CY (t)￿, where an asterisk is
used to denote variables associated with the South.
In each period, households allocate ￿xed shares of expenditure to each sector. For the traditional
sector we have
PY (t)CY (t) = (1 ￿ ￿)E(t) and P￿
Y (t)C￿
Y (t) = E￿(t); (3)
where PY (t) and P￿
Y (t) are the prices for traditional goods in the North and South, and for the
manufacturing sector we have
PX(t)X(t) = ￿E(t): (4)












where p(i;t) and p￿(j;t) are the prices paid for goods i and j, which have been produced in the
North and South, respectively. Northern households allocate expenditure in the X-sector across the
n(t) + n￿(t) varieties available at time t. The instantaneous demand functions are
x(i;t) = ￿p(i;t)￿￿PX(t)￿￿1E(t); x￿(j;t) = ￿p￿(j;t)
￿￿PX(t)￿￿1E(t); (6)
for varieties that are produced domestically and those that are o⁄shored. For the remainder of the
paper we suppress time notation unless needed.
62.2 The Labour Market
The labour markets of the North and South have the basic characteristics of the Roy (1951) model
of occupational choice. Skills are distributed continuously across populations of workers with masses
M and M￿ according to the time invariant, ￿nite, and strictly increasing skill distribution functions
G(z) and G￿(z￿), both with support [0;1]. Markets are perfectly segmented in that we assume there
is no international migration. Workers are free, however, to move between sectors with negligible
costs of switching employment.
The productivity of a worker depends on the type of activity undertaken. While all workers
are capable of producing one unit of e⁄ective labour per period in the traditional sector, workers
employed in the manufacturing and innovation sectors can produce ￿i(z) units of e⁄ective labour,
i 2 fX;Ig. ￿i(z) is continuous, and strictly increasing in z and satis￿es the following assumptions:6











Similar conditions exist for the South with the exception that there is no innovation sector. These
assumptions ensure the existence of a comparative advantage for high-skill workers in innovation,
mid-skill workers in manufacturing, and low-skill workers in traditional production. The equilib-
rium allocation of workers across sectors depends on the occupational choice of each worker and is
illustrated in ￿gure 3.
[￿gure 3 about here]
At each moment in time workers choose employment in the activity that o⁄ers the greatest
wage income. This is calculated as the product of the e⁄ective, or per-unit, wage and a workers
productivity in the chosen occupation. We assume a perfectly competitive labour market, and all
￿rms in a given sector i, therefore, pay the same e⁄ective wage, wi for i 2 fY;X;Ig. Accordingly,
6These assumptions parallel those made by Yeaple (2005).
7the distribution of wages in the North is
w(z) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
wY 0 ￿ z ￿ z1
wX￿X(z) z1 ￿ z ￿ z2
wI￿I(z) z2 ￿ z ￿ 1
;
where z1 and z2 are the respective threshold skill levels for a worker who is indi⁄erent between
employment in the traditional and manufacturing sectors, and a worker who is indi⁄erent between
employment in the manufacturing and innovation sectors.
A similar wage distribution exists for the South:
w(z￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
w￿




1 ￿ z ￿ 1
;
where z￿
1 is the threshold skill level for a worker who can earn an equal wage from either the Southern
traditional or manufacturing sectors.
The threshold skill levels determine the e⁄ective relative wages between sectors and the equilib-
rium labour market allocations. Speci￿cally, from the threshold skill levels z1 and z2 we have the
relative wages wY =wX = ￿X(z1) and wI=wX = ￿X(z2)=￿I(z2) in the North, and from the threshold
skill level z￿
1 we have the relative wage w￿
Y =w￿
X = ￿X(z￿
1) in the South. These skill thresholds describe
the equilibrium allocations of workers in both labour markets, and can be used to derive the labour
market clearing conditions for the North,
LY (z1) = M
Z z1
0
dG(z); LX(z1;z2) = M
Z z2
z1



















Changes in the threshold skill levels lead to inter-sectoral adjustments in the allocation of labour
through changes in the e⁄ective relative wages and the labour market clearing conditions.
82.3 Traditional Sector
The traditional sectors produce goods for supply to a perfectly competitive international market that
is characterized by free trade. Production requires e⁄ective labour (LY ) and land (T), and identical



















where 0 < ￿ < 1 represents the labour intensity of production. Under these assumptions the unit









1￿￿ = 1; (10)
where rY and r￿
Y are the respective rents for land in North and South, and we have chosen the
traditional good as the model numeraire. Pro￿t maximization by traditional good producers requires












(1 ￿ ￿)Y ￿
r￿
Y T￿ : (11)
These conditions can be used with (9) and (10) to derive the e⁄ective wages for traditional goods














These e⁄ective wages are clearly rising in land endowments and falling in e⁄ective traditional labour
supplies.
2.4 Manufacturing Sector
The manufacturing sector produces di⁄erentiated varieties for consumption in the North. This mar-
ket is characterized by monopolistic competition and is supplied from domestic and/or o⁄shored
production.
Each ￿rm produces a unique variety, and decides whether to locate production in the North or
o⁄shore it to the South. This decision is in￿ uenced by the trade-o⁄ between two factors: potential
9cost-savings associated with lower wages for e⁄ective manufacturing labour in the South and in-
creased trade costs incurred in the supply of goods from o⁄shored production. Increased trade costs
are modeled in the form of iceberg trade costs, ￿ > 1.
Production technologies are time invariant and identical for all ￿rms, regardless of location. These
technologies are constant-returns-to-scale with unit coe¢ cients and employ e⁄ective manufacturing
labour. As is well known, monopolistically competitive ￿rms charge a constant mark-up over unit
costs. Hence, the price of domestically produced varieties is p = ￿wX=(￿ ￿1), and that of o⁄shored
varieties is p￿ = ￿￿w￿
X=(￿ ￿1). The trade-o⁄ between e⁄ective wages and trade costs is apparent in
the di⁄erence between these two prices.
Using the pricing rules in the demand functions (6) instantaneous operating pro￿ts for ￿rms
















where ! = wX=w￿
X is the relative e⁄ective manufacturing wage, and is equal to the ratio of the
productivities of the lower threshold skill levels in the respective manufacturing sectors given our




Y . Accordingly, adjust-
ments in the threshold skill levels and the relative traditional wage will lead to a change in the
North-South gap between e⁄ective manufacturing wages.
Given our choice of technology, the total e⁄ective labour demands are LX = nx and L￿
X = n￿x￿￿.
Using the demand functions in (6) with the operating pro￿ts given above, the value of these e⁄ective
labour demands can be obtained as
wXLX = (￿ ￿ 1)n￿; w￿
XL￿
X = (￿ ￿ 1)n￿￿￿: (14)
The value of e⁄ective manufacturing labour demand is closely related to the share of industry, relative
e⁄ective wages, and the level of trade costs.
102.5 Innovation Sector
Entry into the manufacturing sector requires a new product design. All designs are developed in the
perfectly competitive innovation sector of the North using knowledge capital and e⁄ective labour.7
Knowledge capital evolves according to the positive intertemporal externality, introduced by
Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), in which a sector wide learning curve exists for
product development. Each new product design adds to the existing stock of knowledge and increases
the productivity of future product development. The stock of knowledge capital is proxied for using
the total number of product designs that have been developed to date: N = n + n￿. The evolution





where g is the rate of growth in product variety.
The value of a product design, v, is equal to the present discounted value of the future stream of
operating pro￿ts. Given the competitive nature of research and development, ￿rms will only produce
new product designs, implying a positive growth rate, when the cost of product development is equal





where the RHS is the cost of developing a new design.
A positive growth rate requires that the rate of return on investment in a new product design
equal that of investment in a risk-free asset. Taking the time derivative of product development costs














These are the free market entry conditions for domestic and o⁄shored manufacturing. The ￿rst term
on the RHS is the dividend rate, and the second is capital gains.
7We assume that there is no innovation sector in the South. This assumption is plausible if one supposes that the
North derives a comparative advantage in innovation from a relatively large stock of knowledge capital that the South
does not have access to.
112.6 Steady-state Equilibrium
This section provides a description of the long-run equilibrium that occurs when manufacturing
shares, and therefore labour allocations, are constant.8 We reduce the system to three steady-
state conditions that solve implicitly for the threshold skill levels z1, z2, and z￿
1. These conditions
are derived from equilibrium in the market for manufactured goods, the steady-state no-arbitrage
conditions, and an equalized rate of return for domestic and o⁄shored production.
Beginning with the manufacturing sector, equilibrium requires that the product markets clear.
Northern expenditure is the sum of labour and land income from the traditional and manufacturing
sectors, and investment income from the domestic and o⁄shored manufacturing industries.9 Equi-
librium supply and demand, therefore, require that ￿E = pnx+p￿n￿x￿. Substituting in the pricing
rules for manufacturing ￿rms and the e⁄ective labour demands (14), and using (11), this condition
can be reorganized as
￿(￿ ￿ 1)!￿X(z1)LY = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿!LX + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿L￿
X: (18)
Clearly (18) is a function of all three skill thresholds.
Next, the e⁄ective labour supplies (14), product development costs (16), and the wage equations









￿ g; ￿ =
L￿
X







where s = n=N is the share of varieties produced in the North, and _ wI = 0 in long-run equilibrium.






Substituting s back into either of the two conditions in (19) and combining the product market
equilibrium (18), we obtain a steady-state condition that links investment and demand,
￿ + LI =





8The reduced system is composed of three control variables. Hence, it can be shown that this economy has no
transition path.
9Note that labour income from innovation equals savings given the competitive nature of the innovation sector.
12and is a function of the skill thresholds z1 and z2.
Finally, we derive our third equation of the system, which equalizes the rate of return for each
type of supply. A quick observation of the no-arbitrage conditions makes it clear that when both
domestic and o⁄shored production exist simultaneously the associated operating pro￿ts must be
equal, ￿ = ￿￿. On the other hand, if all manufacturing goods are supplied from domestic factories,
￿ > ￿￿. Using the traditional wages in (12) and the operating pro￿ts in (13), these two conditions















Accordingly, (22) will bind when a positive share of manufacturing occurs in the South. It will then
determine z1 as a function of z￿
1, and vice versa. In contrast, when ￿ > ! o⁄shoring will not be
pro￿table and z￿
1 = 1.
3 Implications of O⁄shoring: Theory and Evidence
3.1 O⁄shoring, Employment and Growth
In this section we investigate the e⁄ects of a decline in trade costs that leads to the o⁄shoring of
production. The three steady-state conditions derived in the last section, (18), (21), and (22), will
be the main focus of this investigation.
We begin by examining the e⁄ects of a change in ￿ on the steady-state threshold skill levels. It
is important to note here that higher pro￿ts derived through lower costs are required as an incentive
to motivate ￿rms to o⁄shore production. This pro￿t incentive will only exist when trade costs fall
below a threshold level, and steady-state condition (22) binds. In the following we assume this to
always be the case.
Accordingly, the economy can be described by the following three equation system of implicit
13functions that describes the relationships between the threshold skill levels:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿LX + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿L￿
X ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿￿X(z1)LY = 0;

















￿ ￿ = 0:
Comparative statics for the e⁄ect of a change in trade costs on all three skill thresholds can be
derived from this system of implicit functions. These are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Trade liberalization causes an increase in employment in the Northern traditional
and innovation sectors, and the Southern manufacturing sector, and causes a decrease in employment












Trade liberalization leads to adjustments in the allocation of labour in both the North and South.
While Southern employment decreases for the traditional sector and increases for the manufacturing
sector, in the North manufacturing employment contracts with the lowest skilled workers moving
to the traditional sector and the highest skilled workers ￿nding new employment in innovation.
This result also supports the argument that increased import competition and o⁄shoring have had a
strong impact on labour composition, even if they have had little in￿ uence on aggregate employment
(Coe, 2007).
As discussed above, the fall in z2 infers an increase in employment in the innovation sector,
and hence a greater rate of growth in product variety. This model con￿rms the theoretical result
that there is a positive correlation between o⁄shoring and economic growth, obtained in Martin and
Ottaviano (1999), Glass and Saggi (2001) and Gao (2005).10 The mechanism through which stronger
economic growth is achieved parallels that of Naghavi and Ottaviano (2008), where o⁄shoring leads
to a release of labour from manufacturing which can be reallocated to innovation activities. In this
10As our de￿nition of o⁄shoring in this model is quite general, we include literature on FDI or outsourcing and
growth under this category.
14case, the size of increases in economic growth will diminish as the overall labour productivity of the
innovation sector is pushed down by the lower than average skill levels of workers who relocate from
the manufacturing sector. In other words, less productive workers are drawn from the manufacturing
sector to accelerate the development of new varieties.
The discussion of the results summarized in proposition 1 implies that a decrease in trade costs
leads to an increase in the share of production o⁄shored by manufacturing ￿rms. This can be veri￿ed
by taking the total derivative of the share of domestic manufacturing (20). The result is summarized
in the following proposition.































Trade liberalization has a negative impact on the share of Northern manufacturing. This e⁄ect
is monotonic for all levels of trade costs.
3.2 Wages and Productivity
We address the issues of wage inequality and absolute wages in various sectors next, proceeding ￿rst
with the impact of o⁄shoring on the e⁄ective wages of the traditional sectors, as they are the base
upon which all other e⁄ective wages in the same country are calculated. The impact of a change in
trade costs on wY and w￿
Y can be examined by taking the total derivatives of the conditions given
in (12). The results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Trade liberalization has a negative e⁄ect on e⁄ective wages in the Northern tradi-




























For a given amount of land, trade liberalization results in a larger number of workers in the
Northern traditional sector (proposition 1), hence reducing the marginal productivity and the real
15wages of workers in that sector. The reverse argument holds for the South, where the number of
workers in the traditional sector falls and they enjoy higher real wages.
With the comparative static for the changes in wY and w￿
Y in hand, we are now in position
to examine the e⁄ects of trade liberalization on the e⁄ective wages in the Northern and Southern





1). Taking the total
derivatives we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Trade liberalization has a negative impact on Northern manufacturing wages and a













































As for wX, both the ￿rst and second terms on the RHS of the equality are positive because
z1 rises when ￿ is reduced (proposition 1). This implies that wX falls by more than wY due to
the additional e⁄ect of the second term on the RHS of the equation. This results in reduced wage
inequality between manufacturing and traditional workers. Note that the fall in wX due to an
increased amount of o⁄shored production and imports is in accordance with the stylized facts on
Northern manufacturing wages illustrated in ￿gure 1. Workers that switch to traditional employment
as a result of o⁄shoring are the least skilled in the manufacturing sector. This shift of labour
therefore pulls up the average labour productivity of the manufacturing sector. These changes in
the composition of the Northern labour force are consistent with the ￿ndings of Antonietti and
Antonioli (2007), who ￿nd that a skill-bias e⁄ect in Italy￿ s manufacturing labour force composition
stems primarily from a fall in the employment of production workers caused by ￿rms￿o⁄shoring
activities. The basic result for Southern manufacturing real wages parallel that for wX, but works
in the opposite direction. The ￿rst term again represents the positive change in w￿
Y . There is
another positive e⁄ect on w￿
X, however, as highlighted by the second term. This leads to rising wage
inequality between sectors in the South.11
Finally, we investigate the impact of trade liberalization on wages in the innovation sector. The
e⁄ective wage is wI = wX
￿X(z2)
￿I(z2) . Taking the total derivative, we obtain the following proposition.
11These results re￿ect those obtain in Antras, Garciano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
16Proposition 5 While the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the e⁄ective wage of the innovation sector
is ambiguous, o⁄shoring necessarily leads to increased wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
























We know from proposition 4 that the second term is positive and puts downward pressure on
wages in the innovation sector when trade is liberalized. The ￿rst term, however, results in an
increase in innovation wages as the term in brackets is negative and dz2
d￿ > 0.12 This creates a
positive force that results in a larger increase (or a lower fall) in wI with respect to wX. Wage
inequality between mid-skilled manufacturing workers and high-skilled innovation workers therefore
rises as a result of o⁄shoring.13 This also means that if wX falls, then wI could also fall, but if so
it falls by less. To sum up, the fall in the average productivity of workers increases the e⁄ective
innovation wage relative to that of the manufacturing sector. An examination of the Northern wage
distribution reveals that this enlarges the wage premium for innovation thereby increasing the level
of wage inequality between these two sectors. The two possible scenarios for the direction and
and degree of changes in Northern wages (wY , wX, and wI) are depicted in ￿gure 4. Notice that
an enhanced distribution of skill in the North, i.e. skill-biased technology adoption, magni￿es the
positive e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on this wage gap as it makes it more likely for z2 to fall more than the
rise in z1.
[￿gure 4 about here]
As for productivity measures, the total e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on labour productivity in the manu-
facturing sectors is ambiguous. The presence of an innovation sector for the highest skilled to move
to makes it theoretically possible for o⁄shoring to o⁄set productivity improvements in the manufac-
turing sector brought about by the discharge of the least skilled workers.14 The overall impact on
average labour productivity in manufacturing will depend on which of these labour reallocations is
12Recall the comparative advantage assumptions for relatively high skilled workers in jobs that require more skills.
13Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 2003) and Hijzen (2007) are among empirical works that present evidence on
o⁄shoring-related increased wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour.
14Several works with empirical evidence from other countries such as Goerg and Hanley (2003) and Goerg, Hanley,
and Stroble (2004) on Ireland, and Calabrese and Erbetta (2004) on Italy, have found neither a signi￿cant nor a
17larger. Stylized facts on the US manufacturing sector, however, do not show such a trend, implying
that the growth-inducing e⁄ect of o⁄shoring is not large enough to outweigh the shift of workers to
inferior jobs with no skill requirements, thus leading to increased productivity in the manufacturing
sector.15 Note that this is in line with a Pareto distribution, where the population density is continu-
ously denser as we move towards the less skilled portion of the labour market. This in turn supports
the negative relationship between productivity and real wages observed from 2004 onwards.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a simple tractable theoretical model that supports a number of recent empirical
studies and sheds light on the popular debate over the impacts of o⁄shoring on the labour market
in the home country. Using an occupational choice model with endogenous growth, we show how
heterogeneity of skills across workers shapes the recomposition of the labour market that occurs
as a result of o⁄shoring. Adjustments in the labour market in turn determine the levels of o⁄-
shoring, wages, productivity, and employment in the manufacturing sector. Our model can also be
used to explain recent trends in the US labour market associated with o⁄shoring, namely increased
productivity that coincides with lower real wages in the manufacturing sector.
The presence of heterogeneous skills within each sector highlights results that are not attainable
using traditional models of international trade. Introducing occupational choice into the existing
literature on o⁄shoring allows us to examine the impacts of the inter-sectoral recomposition of
workers on real wages and productivity. These results contrast with previous theoretical models of
o⁄shoring, such as Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), where a productivity e⁄ect implies higher
real wages. In addition, the results could explain recent trends in o⁄shoring and manufacturing
strictly positive relationship between o⁄shoring and productivity.
15Our framework can be related to the empirical work of Baily and Lawrence (1994) who ￿nd that only if imports
rise faster than productivity will the number of US jobs being displaced by imports rise over time. This is indeed
the case in our model as o⁄shoring not only increases z1, but also lowers z2. The latter e⁄ect results in a less than
proportional rise in aggregate productivity in the manufacturing sector compared to the rise in imports, which could
then explain the continuous fall in the employment ￿gures of the US manufacturing sector.
18wages in the US since 2004, which show a sharp rise in the o⁄shoring of manufacturing accompanied
by a fall in the real earnings of workers. We also show that wages of the most skilled in the home
country can go either way depending on the degree to which skilled workers are shifted into the
innovation sector. If this impact is large enough to outweigh the shift of the lowest skilled workers
to the traditional sector, the most skilled workers in the North may see an improvement in their
absolute real wages.
Labour market adjustments in the North also lead to aggregate productivity e⁄ects in the North-
ern manufacturing sector, in a similar fashion to Roy (1951). In particular, productivity could in-
crease as the least skilled workers move to the traditional sector. This e⁄ect is counterbalanced,
however, by a movement of the most skilled to the innovation sector. We prove this to indeed be
the direction of change in the recomposition of the labour market and the consequence on aggregate
productivity in the manufacturing sector to be ambiguous. Increased aggregate productivity ￿gures
in the US manufacturing sector, however, hint that the upgrading of labour to the innovation sector
has not been signi￿cant enough to o⁄set the ￿ ow of the least skilled to the traditional sector. Finally,
we show that a larger innovation sector is always a positive side-e⁄ect of o⁄shoring, which enhances
economic growth in the North. This however is accompanied by rising wage inequality between the
skilled and unskilled in the North, and between traditional and manufacturing workers in the South.
Our model clearly has its limits and cannot be used for a global welfare analysis of o⁄shoring. In
particular, we do not study in detail the consumption behavior of the Southern population, and do
not take into consideration the possibility of development and innovation in the South. Neither do
we consider from migration issues, which could have important implications for the wage dynamics
observed in the North. We hope to tackle these issues in future work, putting more emphasis on the
developing country. Other interesting lines of research would be to look at the o⁄horing issue in a
more speci￿c manner, namely in the context of intermediate goods, services, or R&D.
195 Appendix
Derivation of the steady-state condition for product market equilibrium (16)
￿E = pnx + p￿n￿x￿

























￿(￿ ￿ 1)wY LY = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿wXLX + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿w￿
XL￿
X
￿(￿ ￿ 1)wX￿X(z1)LY = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿wXLX + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿w￿
XL￿
X
￿(￿ ￿ 1)!￿X(z1)LY = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿!LX + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿L￿
X
Derivation of the steady-state condition for investment and demand (19)
First, we rewrite the no-arbitrage condition for Northern production.
￿ + g =
￿
v





















￿![￿LX + ￿X(z1)LY ]
(￿ ￿ ￿)￿
:
Now, we substitute this condition into the steady-state no-arbitrage condition above obtain
￿ + LI =





Proposition 1: comparative statics for threshold skill levels


















































j11 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿L0








j12 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿L0
X(z2) > 0;











































































The determinant of the Jacobian matrix, J, is
jJj = j11j22j33 ￿ j13j22j31 ￿ j12j21j33 < 0;
where j11j22j33 < 0, j13j22j31 > 0, and j12j21j33 > 0.

























d￿ can be shown to be positive. Given that jJj < 0, this requires showing that the
numerator is negative. This will be the case if j11 ￿ t1j31 < 0, given that j12j21 > 0 and j22 > 0.










[(￿ ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)L￿
X ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿￿X(z1)LY ] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿L0
X(z1):











￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿LX + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿L￿
X] < 0:
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24Figure 1: Stylized Facts on Offshoring
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25Figure 2: Stylized Facts on US Labor Market
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Figure 4: Skills, Wage Dispersion, and Labour Reallocation
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